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Comments on Pretext in Employment
Discrimination Litigation: Mandatory
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Carolyn L. Wheeler*
It is perhaps surprising that nearly forty years after Congress enacted Title
VII,' courts still struggle with the most fundamental questions of how to
analyze evidence proffered to prove discrimination, and how to instruct juries
charged with determining whether employers have violated the law. Although
jury trials have been available in Title VII cases only since Congress passed the
far-reaching amendments contained in the Civil Rights Act of 1991,2 the basic
proof paradigms have been well-developed since the Supreme Court first
confronted Title VII cases in the early 1970s.3 The lower courts nevertheless
* Assistant General Counsel, Appellate Services Division, Office of General Counsel,
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. The views expressed in this paper are those of
the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Commission except where reference is
made to arguments advanced in briefs filed by the Commission.
1. "Title VII" is the shorthand label used to refer to the employment discrimination
provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-I el seq. (2000).
2. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981 a (2000) (providing for compensatory and punitive damages
under Title VII and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) in cases of intentional
discrimination and trial by jury when such damages are sought). This provision was the
centerpiece of the 1991 amendments. See Civil Rights Act of 199 1, Pub. L. No. 102-166 § 102,
105 Stat. 1071 § 3 (1991) (describing the four purposes of the act and stating that one of the
purposes was "to provide appropriate remedies for intentional and unlawful harassment in the
workplace"). On the other hand, jury trials have been available under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. (2000) since it was enacted in 1967.
See 29 U.S.C. § 626(c)(2) (2000) (providing for a trial by jury in age discrimination
employment actions); Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 585 (1978) (finding Congress intended
that "under the ADEA a trial by jury would be available where sought by one of the parties").
3. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-03 (1973) (explaining
proof paradigm for disparate treatment cases). Courts have applied the disparate treatment proof
scheme without exception by courts in ADEA cases. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S.
424, 436 (1971) (holding that Title VII requires elimination of practices that operate invidiously
to discriminate on the basis of race unless related to job performance, regardless of employer's
lack of discriminatory intent; that is, holding that the disparate impact theory is available under
Title VII); Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 141-42 (2000) (citing
lower court cases so holding, and assuming arguendo that the McDonnell Douglas framework
applies to ADEA case). On the other hand, there has been greater doubt about whether the
disparate impact analysis applies in ADEA cases. See Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S.
604, 610 (1993) (leaving open the question of whether a disparate impact theory of liability is
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struggle to translate the statutory and Supreme Court pronouncements into jury
instructions. These efforts are fl-aught with difficulty in part because, as the
Court has noted, "the question facing triers of fact in discrimination cases is
both sensitive and difficult.",4 The sensitivity of these factual questions derives
in part from the awareness that laws against discrimination embody one of the
nation's highest priorities.' The questions are also sensitive because it is a
serious matter to charge an employer with flouting these fundamental
prohibitions, and a difficult and emotionally challenging task to render a
judgment about what really motivated an employer's decisions. Jurors, for the
most part, are people who have held jobs and who may be sympathetic with
persons who have suffered indignities in the workplace, and yet they do not
want to impose liability unjustifiably and perhaps thereby unfairly label an
employer as racist or sexist. More to the point, judges want to be sure that
jurors make their decisions based only on the law and facts presented, and not
on their sympathies for the plaintiff. Because the question posed in
employment discrimination is sensitive and difficult, and because the cases
typically involve factual situations that resonate in common workplace
experiences, the courts' task of formulating instructions that clearly guide
jurors' deliberations in accordance with the law is particularly crucial. The
courts' task has frequently generated divergent views about how to understand
the evidence and law in discrimination cases.
Another question somewhat analogous to the pretext instruction issue Mr.
Vollmer discussed in his Note, that has also generated confusion, is whether to
instruct a jury on "mixed motives" in the absence of direct evidence. The
mixed motives rubric applies when it appears that both legitimate and
illegitimate reasons motivated an employer to take action against an employee
or applicant for employment. In a 1989 sex discrimination case, the Supreme
Court decided that if an employer is partly motivated by a discriminatory reason
it could nonetheless avoid liability if it could demonstrate that it would have
made the same decision without reliance on the prohibited characteristic.
6
available under the ADEA).
4. United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716 (1983).
5. See, e.g., McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ'g Co., 513 U.S. 352, 357 (1995)
(describing the ADEA as "but part of a wider statutory scheme to protect employees in the
workplace nationwide" that includes Title VII and the Americans with Disabilities Act, and as
"part of an ongoing congressional effort to eradicate discrimination in the workplace,
reflect[ing] a societal condemnation of invidious bias in employment decisions"); Albemarle
Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 416 (1975) (describing Title VII's remedial provision for
back pay as "part of a complex legislative design directed at an historic evil of national
proportions").
6. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228,258 (1989) (stating that when a Title
460
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Justice O'Connor wrote a concurring opinion in which she stated that the
plaintiff would need to present "direct evidence" to show that the employer's
"decisional process has been substantially infected by discrimination" before
the special burden shift would be triggered.7
Congress responded to Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins8 and other Supreme
Court decisions by enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which expressly
overruled the premise that an employer could avoid liability under Title VII by
establishing the same decision defense. 9 Instead, Congress provided that an
employer that established it would have taken the same action "in the absence
of the impermissible motivating factor" would not be liable for back pay,
reinstatement, or damages, but would only be subject to declaratory and
injunctive relief, attorney's fees, and costs.'0 The statute says nothing about the
type of evidence needed to establish that a prohibited factor motivated a
decision or to shift the burden to the employer to prove its affirmative defense.
Most Courts regarded Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Price
Waterhouse as the controlling analysis of the proof requirements in that case,
and the majority of lower courts therefore assumed that the mixed motives
burden-shifting depended on the plaintiff's presentation of direct evidence of
discrimination." Most lower courts' views on that point did not change with
passage of the Civil Rights Act.' 2
In its recent decision in Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa," the Supreme Court
attempted to alleviate the burgeoning confusion in the lower courts about the
evidence necessary to trigger the mixed motives analysis and garner a mixed
motives jury instruction in a Title VII case. The Court concluded, in a
VII plaintiff proves gender was a motivating factor, "the defendant may avoid a finding of
liability only by proving by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have made the same
decision even if it had not taken the plaintiff's gender into account").
7. Id. at 269, 270 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
8. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
9. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2000) (codifying the motivating factor standard for
proving a violation when "other factors also motivated the practice").
10. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (2000).
II. See Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 299 F.3d 838, 852-53 (9th Cir. 2002) (surveying the
opinions of the courts of appeals on the need for direct evidence in mixed motives cases, but
holding that such a requirement is untenable under the statute and noting that the "best way out
of th[e] morass" of contradictory and conflicting decisions by the courts of appeals is to "return
to the language of the statute, which imposes no special requirement and does not reference
'direct evidence"'), aff'd 123 S. Ct. 2148 (2003); see also Desert Palace Inc. v. Costa, 123 S.
Ct. 2148, 2152 (2003) (citing lower court cases that held direct evidence is required to establish
liability under section 2000e-2(m)).
12. Civil Rights Act of 1991,42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000).
13. Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 123 S. Ct. 2148 (2003).
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unanimous opinion, that a plaintiff need not present direct evidence of
discrimination to obtain a mixed motives instruction.14 Using the statutory text
as its "starting point," the Court observed that "Section 2000e-2(m)
unambiguously states that a plaintiff need only 'demonstrat[e]' that an
employer used a forbidden consideration."15 The Court stressed that the
statutory text "does not mention, much less require, that a plaintiff make a
heightened showing through direct evidence."'16  Moreover, the Court
emphasized, the statute's silence on the type of evidence required in mixed
motives cases "also suggests that [the Court] should not depart from the
'conventional rul[e] of civil litigation [that] generally appl[ies] in Title VII
cases' ... [that requires] a plaintiff [to] prove his case 'by a preponderance of
the evidence'.., using 'direct or circumstantial evidence. '" 7 As the Court
continued the rationale for "treating circumstantial and direct evidence alike is
both clear and deep-rooted: 'Circumstantial evidence is not only sufficient, but
may also be more certain, satisfying and persuasive than direct evidence.""0
8
Accordingly, to obtain an instruction under § 2000e-2(m), the Court stated,
"[A] plaintiff need only present sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to
conclude, by a preponderance of the evidence, that 'race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice."" 9
While the Supreme Court found no basis in the statutory text or the law of
evidence for a direct evidence requirement, the lower courts' misreading of the
statute is understandable given their reliance on the prior Supreme Court
decision in Price Waterhouse.20 In contrast, the reason for the diverging views
on the need for a "pretext" instruction-the topic of Mr. Vollmer's excellent
Note-is somewhat less easy to comprehend. 2' The Note gives a
14. Id. at 2155.
15. Id. at 2153.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 2154 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
18. Id. (citation omitted).
19. Id. at 2155 (quoting § 2000e-2(m)).
20. In Desert Palace, the Court declined to decide whether Justice O'Connor's opinion
had been the controlling opinion in Price Waterhouse because the "starting point" for analysis
"is the statutory text." Id. at 2153.
21. The need for this instruction has been hotly contested in employment discrimination
cases. It is an issue upon which the Equal Employment OpportunityCommission (Commission)
has had occasion to express its views with some frequency. See, e.g., Conroy v. Abraham
Chevrolet-Tampa, Inc., No. 8:01-CV-1466 (M.D. Fla. 2003),appealpendingNo. 03-11405-GG
(I I th Cir.) (in which the Commission filed a brief as amnicus curiae); Townsend v. Lumbermens
Mut. Cas. Co., 294 F.3d 1232,1233 (lOth Cir. 2002) (same); Ratliffv. City of Gainesville, 256
F.3d 355, 357 (5th Cir. 2001) (same).
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comprehensive, thorough, and balanced review of the evolution of the
evidentiary standards and proof paradigms applied in employment
discrimination cases, and of the arguments for and against mandating a pretext
instruction, and concludes that whether to give a pretext instruction should be
left to the court's discretion. From the perspective of a litigant for the agency
charged with the interpretation, administration, and enforcement of the federal
laws prohibiting employment discrimination, the Note's ultimate conclusion is
not entirely tenable.22 While Mr. Vollmer identifies an emerging split in the
courts of appeals on whether a pretext instruction should be given as a matter of
course, there is much less justification for the difference of opinion on this
issue than there was for the difference of opinions on the mixed motives
question. The Supreme Court has made it pellucidly clear that the pretext
instruction embodies a correct statement of the law,23 and thus, in the
Commission's view, there is no basis for a trial judge's refusal to give this
instruction to the jury in appropriate cases.
The instruction in question is usually formulated in something like the
following language: "If you do not believe the defendant's stated reason for the
decision, you may, but need not, presume the defendant was motivated by race
discrimination. 24 This instruction is the "pretext" or "negative inference"
22. Congress has specifically charged the Commission with enforcement authority for
Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (2000). It acquired from the Department of Labor the
authority to enforce the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. (2000)
and the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(2000), through the Executive
Reorganization Plan of 1978, 5 U.S.C. § 901 et. seq. (2000); and it was charged by Congress
with enforcement authority for the employment provisions in Subchapter I of the Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (2000).
23. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 153 (2000) (concluding
that the prima facie case and sufficient evidence of pretext may permit the trier of fact to find
unlawful discrimination without additional independent evidence of discrimination).
24. See, e.g., Townsend v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 294 F.3d 1232, 1236-37 (10th
Cir. 2002) (discussing plaintiff's proffer of an instruction identical to the Eighth Circuit Court
of Appeals' Model Instruction 5.95, which states, "You may find that plaintiff's race was a
motivating factor in defendant's decision to demote or discharge plaintiff if it has been proved
by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant's stated reasOn(s) for its decisions are not the
true reasons, but are a 'pretext' to hide discriminatory motivation"); see also Ratliffv. City of
Gainesville, 256 F.3d 355, 359 (5th Cir. 2001) (plaintiff's proffered instruction stated, "If the
Plaintiff disproves the reasons offered by Defendants by a preponderance of the evidence, you
may presume that the employer was motivated by age discrimination."); Conroy v. Abraham
Chevrolet-Tampa, Inc., No. 8:01-CV-1466 slip op. at 4 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 13, 2003) (plaintiff's
proffered but rejected instruction stated, "A plaintiff may attempt to prove pretext directly by
persuading you that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by
showing that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence. Disbelief of the
defendant's explanation may be enough to infer discrimination.").
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instruction plaintiffs ordinarily seek when they have attempted to prove their
case through indirect evidence.
While it may sound like an oxymoron to suggest that it is "mandatory" for
a court give an instruction on a "permissible inference," the real point is that, in
many cases, if a court fails to give such an instruction the result will be
prejudicial error.2 5 Given that possibility, trial courts should ordinarily give the
instruction and avoid the risk of reversal and the adverse effects on judicial
economy and efficiency of needing to conduct new trials. To illustrate why it
will usually constitute prejudicial error to refuse to instruct a jury on the
permissible negative inference in cases involving purely circumstantial
evidence, it might be helpful to consider the evidence in a hypothetical case,
and then explain how the Title VII proof requirements would apply to that
evidence. Consider the following hypothetical:
Mr. Jones, an African American, began working for ABC Company in
1990 as a marketing manager, and over the course often years he received
numerous merit raises and performance bonuses. In 1996, he was
promoted to a pilot position as a unit manager in which he supervised six
subordinate marketing managers and sales persons. He had a bachelor's
degree in business administration when he was hired. During the course of
his employment he attended classes at night and earned his MBA. He also
took numerous training courses and programs provided by his employer in
personnel management, emerging technology, new software programs used
by the company, as well as workshops and seminars about each new
product ABC intended to market. In 2000, a new director of marketing
strategies transferred in as Mr. Jones's boss. Three months later the new
director demoted Mr. Jones to a nonmanagerial position. The director told
him the company's sales record no longerjustified continuation of the unit
manager position he had held for four years. Nine months later, ABC fired
him, stating that things were not working out. Mr. Jones asked for a chance
to improve his work and asked what he needed to do, but was told it was
too late. He filed a charge with the EEOC alleging race discrimination in
the decisions to demote and fire him.
ABC Company told the EEOC that it demoted Mr. Jones because of his
poor performance and that it subsequently fired him for the same reason.
When asked for specifics, the company said that it decided to demote Mr.
Jones because he was not keeping up with new marketing strategies and
was not good at motivating his subordinates. Further, the company said
25. See Townsend, 294 F.3d at 1243 (reversing due to erroneous instructions); Ratliff, 256
F.3d at 364 (same); Smith v. Borough of Wilkinsburg, 147 F.3d 272,281 (3d Cir. 1998) (same);
Cabrera v. Jakabovitz, 24 F.3d 372,382 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding in housing discrimination case
that the jury needs to be told that it "is entitled to infer, but need not infer" that defendant did
not meet its burden of proof if the jury "disbelieve[s] the defendant's explanation").
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that after it demoted Mr. Jones, he became indifferent toward his job, did
little work, and failed to submit a performance improvement plan as
requested.
Mr. Jones asked for a right to sue notice and filed suit in federal court
seeking reinstatement and damages under Title VII. His case was tried by a
jury. Mr. Jones submitted the following evidence: that he was the only
African American to have been promoted to a unit manager position; that
his personnel file contained only positive evaluations of his performance in
that position; that one month before his demotion he had been given a merit
raise; that all of his subordinates had received awards and commendations
from the company; that a white person with only two years of college was
placed in his former unit manager position; that no one else had ever been
demoted from a management position unless he or she had been counseled
about performance deficiencies; and that he had not been asked to submit a
performance plan but that two white employees who were told to submit
performance improvement plans did not do so but were not fired.
ABC Company managers testified that they had repeatedly counseled Mr.
Jones that they were concerned about his failure to motivate his
subordinates and his failure to learn the new products the company planned
to market. These managers stated that the individual they promoted to the
unit manager position had exceptional managerial skills despite his lack of
experience and education.
Why should the plaintiff get a pretext instruction at the end of this case? It
is axiomatic that a plaintiff has a right to an instruction on his theory of the
case, provided that his theory is both valid in law and supported by evidence in
the record.26 As the Third Circuit explained in Smith v. Borough of
Wilkinsburg,27 "It is black letter law that '[i]t is the inescapable duty of the trial
judge to instruct the jurors, fully and correctly, on the applicable law of the
case, and to guide, direct, and assist them toward an intelligent understanding
of the legal and factual issues involved in their search for the truth."' 28 The
court stressed that "it is clear that the jury must be given the legal context in
which it is to find and apply the facts."29 The question thus is whether the
pretext instruction embodies the theory of the plaintiff's case in this scenario, or
26. See, e.g., Febres v. Challenger Caribbean Corp., 214 F.3d 57,62 (Ist Cir. 2000) ("A
party has a right to an instruction on her theory of the case, provided that her theory is both
valid in law and supported by evidence in the record."); Mooney v. Aramco Servs. Co., 54 F.3d
1207, 1217 (5th Cir. 1995) (stating that a plaintiff is entitled to instruction on legal theory if he
or she submits evidence on the theory's requisite elements).
27. Smith v. Borough of Wilkinsburg, 147 F.3d 272 (3d Cir. 1998).
28. Id. at 278.
29. Id. at 280.
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whether it is just one of many possible permissible factual inferences that ajury
may draw without special legal instruction to do so.
Although the overarching theory in every discrimination case is that the
plaintiff has been the victim of discriminatory treatment, a fair statement of the
specific theory, or of the legal context, to be submitted to the jury in many cases
is that the plaintiff has proven that she was the victim of discrimination by
demonstrating that the employer's stated reasons for its actions are incredible
and that discrimination is therefore the more likely explanation for what
happened. In the hypothetical case described above, for example, the plaintiff
has no direct evidence of the employer's reason for demoting and firing him, so
the theory he must present to the jury is that the reasons the employer has given
are so obviously contrived, contradictory, and contrary to the evidence that the
employer must be lying to cover up a discriminatory motive. If that is the
theory, he is entitled to the pretext instruction if it is a correct statement of the
law and if his evidence supports that theory.30
There cannot be any real doubt that the pretext instruction captures an
accurate legal principle. It is instructive, however, to review how the pretext
(issue emerges as the central disputed point in most circumstantial evidence
cases in order to understand why the instruction is both legally sound and
crucial to guide the jurors' deliberations in such cases. To prevail on a Title
VII claim, all that the statute requires is that a plaintiff demonstrate that race or
another protected characteristic (color, religion, national origin, or sex) was the
cause of an employment decision. 3' Quite -simply, all that is meant by
intentional discrimination is that a prohibited characteristic motivated the
decision. A plaintiff may prove such an intentional discrimination claim
without producing any direct or affirmative evidence of the employer's motive
for its decision.32 This point is crucial because plaintiffs seldom have access to
30. See supra note 24 and accompanying text (stating that a plaintiff has a right to ajury
instruction on his theory if his theory is supported by law and evidence).
31. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000) (defining unlawful employment practices).
Specifically, the statute states:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin[.]
Id.
32. See, e.g., Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 123 S. Ct. 2148, 2154 (2003) (finding that
conventional rules of civil litigation apply in Title VII cases, permitting plaintiffs to prevail
when they prove their cases by a preponderance of the evidence using either or both
circumstantial and direct evidence (citing U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460
U.S. 711, 714 n.3 (1983))).
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any direct evidence of the employer's discriminatory motives.33 Whatever type
of evidence the plaintiff relies on, the central factual question in most cases that
get to a jury is whether the motive for the employer's action was
discriminatory.
The Supreme Court long ago endorsed a three-part allocation of burdens
of production to guide the inquiry into the ultimate question of whether
discrimination was the reason for a challenged employment decision when
there is no direct evidence of the employer's motives. This framework is used
by courts to assess the sufficiency of evidence to survive summaryjudgment, so
if cases are submitted to a jury there is usually no need for discussion of this
proof scheme. Nevertheless, it is helpful to understand the paradigm to
appreciate the pretext issue and the evidence that is presented and argued to
juries. First, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case consisting of four
essential points: membership in a protected class (which is usually obvious and
easy to establish, since all persons of all races, colors, national origins,
religions, and both genders are protected by Title VII); qualification for the job
in question (meaning that she meets the stated experience and educational
requirements for the job); that she applied for the job and did not get it (or that
she was discharged if it is a discharge case); and that the job remained open and
the employer hired someone (usually outside the protected class) of similar
qualifications (or replaced the plaintiff with someone of similar qualifications
in a discharge case).34 The Supreme Court has emphasized that the prima facie
showing is not onerous,35 and that the elements are flexible and must be
adapted to the particular factual situation.
36
33. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 141 (2000) ("[TIhere
will seldom be 'eyewitness' testimony as to the employer's mental processes." (quoting Aikens,
460 U.S. at 716)).
34. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502,506 (1993) (summarizing the lower
court's finding that a prima facie case was established by proving that plaintiff was black,
qualified for the job, demoted from the job and discharged, and that the position remained open
until it was filled by a white man); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802
(1973) (establishing the prima facie case for racial discrimination); accord Tex. Dep't of Cmty.
Aft. v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,253 n.6 (1981) (quoting McDonnell Douglas, 41 1 U.S. at 802).
35. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253.
36. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802 n.13 ("The facts necessarily will vary in Title
VII cases, and the specification... of the prima facie proof required from [a plaintiff] is not
necessarily applicable in every respect to differing factual situations."); accordAikens, 460 U.S.
at 715 (noting that plaintiff's burden of proof to establish a prima facie case varies with the
facts); Fumco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978) (suggesting that the
McDonnell Douglas inquiry is not rigid); Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253-54 n.6 (same (quoting
McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802)).
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The point, for purposes of this discussion, is that proof of these facts
eliminates the two most common reasons that someone may not get hired for a
job-that she does not meet the stated qualifications or that the employer
decided not to hire anyone at the time.3 In the Jones hypothetical, the plaintiff
established the requisite prima facie elements by showing that he is a protected
minority, that he was qualified for the job by virtue of his education and
experience and with evidence of his performance reviews, promotion and
bonuses, that he suffered adverse employment actions, and that others outside
his protected class received more favorable treatment. This showing creates a
rebuttable inference of discrimination because it eliminates the possibilities that
ABC Company fired Mr. Jones because he was unqualified to do the job or that
ABC simply eliminated his job for economic reasons.
As the Supreme Court has explained, if the plaintiff meets this light
burden it then becomes necessary for the employer to explain the reason for its
decision."8 An employer loses if it offers no explanation.39 The reason for this
result, according to the Court, is that it is presumed that employers are rational
and act for some reason when making employment decisions, 40 and that they
are in the best position to explain what those reasons are.4' The employer's
burden is only to explain what its reason is. It does not have to prove by a
preponderance that it took the action for the stated reason. 42 In the hypothetical
case, ABC Company met its burden when it advanced as a reason for Mr.
37. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253-54 ("The prima facie case serves an important function
in the litigation: it eliminates the most common nondiscriminatory reasons for the plaintiff's
rejection."); Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358 n.44 (1977) (stating
that the McDonnell Douglas formula requires plaintiffs to eliminate "the two most common
legitimate reasons ... to reject a job applicant").
38. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802 (explaining that the burden shifts to the
employer to articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its decision).
39. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 509 (stating that no issue of fact remains for the trier of fact if
the defendant "has failed to introduce evidence which, taken as true, would permit the
conclusion that there was a non-discriminatory reason for the adverse action").
40. Furnco Construction, 438 U.S. at 577 ("[W]hen all legitimate reasons for rejecting an
applicant have been eliminated as possible reasons for the employer's actions, it is more likely
than not the employer, who we generally assume acts only with some reason, based his decision
on an impermissible consideration such as race.").
41. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 147 (2000) ("[T]he
employer is in the best position to put forth the actual reason for its decision.").
42. See Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Aff. v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 257 (1981) (stating that an
employer .need not persuade the trier of fact, but must produce admissible evidence of a
nondiscriminatory reason for the employment decision to rebut the presumption raised by the
plaintiff's prima facie case); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)
(establishing the employer's burden).
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Jones's demotion and subsequent termination that his performance was poor in
that he did not learn new marketing strategies or motivate his subordinates.
After the employer meets its burden of articulating a reason, the case
moves to the third stage and the plaintiff has the opportunity to prevail by
attacking the credibility or veracity of the employer's stated reason for its
decision.43 Of course this description of the proof burdens does not control the
presentation of evidence at trial and when we say that the case "moves" to the
third stage, that only describes a step in the analysis of the evidence, not any
actual sequence of events in the courtroom. In the hypothetical Jones case, at
this third stage it is apparent that Mr. Jones can prevail only if the jury believes
the employer is lying to hide a discriminatory motive. Mr. Jones has no direct
evidence of ABC's motive, but he has considerable circumstantial evidence that
casts doubt on the company's explanation that it fired him for performance
problems. His evidence shows that a month before he was demoted he had
been given a merit raise, that his personnel file contained only positive
evaluations and that his subordinates had received awards and commendations
(despite the allegation that he did not know how to motivate his subordinates).
Further, his evidence showed that he was the only African American who had
ever held a management position and that after firing him, ABC Company
placed a white person in his job who had markedly less education and
experience. Finally, his evidence showed that the company did not follow its
usual policy of counseling him about his performance deficiencies (although
the company maintained it had), that he tried to find out how to improve, that
he was not asked to do a performance improvement plan, and that two other
employees who failed to do an improvement plan when asked were not fired.
All of this evidence may make the company's stated reasons seem incredible,
but it does not directly prove that the company had a discriminatory motive.
The point of the pretext instruction is to assist jurors analyzing this type of
evidence to answer properly the ultimate question of what motivated the
employer. According to the Supreme Court Decision in Reeves v. Sanderson
Plumbing Products, Inc. 44 if the fact-finder does not believe that the
employer's stated reason is true, then the fact-finder is permitted to infer that
the real reason for the action is discrimination.45 In Reeves, the Court held that
43. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256 (explaining that shifting burdens are necessary to ensure that
the plaintiff will have the opportunity to prove that the proffered justification is a pretext for
discrimination). The Court further stated that the plaintiff's burden of showing pretext "merges
with the ultimate burden of persuading the court that she has been the victim of intentional
discrimination." Id. at 256.
44. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000).
45. See id. at 148 ("[A] plaintiff's prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to
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the prima facie case and sufficient evidence of pretext may permit the trier of
fact to find unlawful discrimination without additional independent evidence of
discrimination, although such a showing will not always be adequate to sustain
a jury's finding of liability.46 The question posed by Mr. Vollmer's Note is
whether jurors need to be told this, or if they will know it from their common
experiences.
The Commission believes that if cases are submitted to juries, 47 the lesson
of the Reeves decision is that it is incumbent on trial courts to instruct jurors
that if they do not believe the employer's stated reasons for its actions, they are
entitled to infer that the pretextual reason is a cover up for discrimination.48 In
the Jones hypothetical case, we have established that the plaintiff's theory is
that he was demoted and fired because of his race and that a jury can
reasonably come to that conclusion based on the employer's shifting and
apparently false explanations for its decisions. We have said he is entitled to an
instruction that articulates his theory of the case if it is a correct statement of the
law, and it is supported by the evidence in the record. Here, the plaintiff's
proof clearly satisfies this burden, and in the absence of any direct evidence of
motive or animus, the plaintiff can prevail only if the jury believes the employer
is lying to hide a discriminatory motive.
In the Commission's view, the permissive inference instruction should be
given in such cases because, first and foremost, it correctly states the law on the
plaintiff's central theory of his case, and second, without it there is a very real
risk that jurors will find for the defendant because they think the plaintiff is
required to prove his case through affirmative evidence. When typical jury
charges are examined as a whole, it is easy to see why jurors might reach that
conclusion. Jury charges always contain an instruction that the plaintiff must
prove discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence and that it is her
find that the employer's asserted justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to conclude
that the employer unlawfully discriminated.").
46. Id. at 148.
47. Obviously, some cases do not warrant submission to a jury because the plaintiff has
not made out a prima facie case or has failed to present any credible evidence that rebuts the
employer's stated reasons for its decision. In such cases, courts properly award summary
judgment to the defendant. See, e.g., Dammen v. UniMed Med. Ctr., 236 F.3d 978, 982 (8th
Cir. 2001) (affirming summary judgment for defendant, and concluding that plaintiff's weak
prima facie evidence and the low probative value of plaintiffs' pretext evidence did not
constitute a submissible case of age discrimination where plaintiff failed to contradict many of
the reasons defendant offered for plaintiffs discharge).
48. See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 148 (factfinder's disbelief of reasons put forward by
defendant may, together with elements of prima facie case, allow jury to infer ultimate fact of
intentional discrimination); see also St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993)
(same).
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burden to do So.49 It is not unreasonable for a juror to think that "evidence"
means affirmative proof. Jury charges also typically contain an instruction not
to second-guess the business judgments of the employer, and that directive
increases the likelihood that they will find discrimination only if the plaintiff
has presented affirmative evidence of bias.50
Although the inference that someone may lie to cover up an illegal motive
is simple to draw, it is not intuitively obvious. This point generated enormous
confusion for courts as they struggled to clarify the relationship between
finding that the employer's stated reason is "unworthy of credence," 5' that is,
that it is a pretext, and finding that the employer discriminated. The Supreme
Court emphasized in St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks52 that the plaintiff
always retains the ultimate burden of proving discriminatory intent.53 The
Court's language in Hicks led some courts to believe that the pretext and
ultimate discrimination issues were separate questions and they assumed that
evidence of pretext was not sufficient, by itself, to support a finding of
discrimination. Thus, they read Hicks to mean that the plaintiff must produce
some affirmative evidence of discriminatory motive in addition to the prima
facie case and pretext evidence. 4 These courts thus imposed a "pretext plus"
49. See, e.g., Townsend v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 294 F.3d 1232, 1243 (10th Cir.
2002) (Henry, J., concurring) (discussing this "preponderance of the evidence" instruction and
its potential for confusing jurors when they reach the pretext question).
50. For example, in Conroy v. Abraham Chevrolet, No. 8:01-CV-1466, slip op. at 4
(M.D. Fla. Feb. 13, 2003), the court instructed the jury:
So far as you are concerned in this case, an employer may discharge, refuse to
promote or otherwise adversely affect an employee for any other reason, good or
bad, fair or unfair, and you must not second guess that decision or permit any
sympathy for the employee to lead you to substitute your own judgment for that of
Defendant even though you personally may not approve of the action taken and
would have acted differently under the circumstances.
51. Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Aff. v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981).
52. St. Mary's Honor Ctr.v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
53. See id. at 518 (quoting Burdine's holding that "[t]he plaintiff retains the burden of
persuasion").
54. See, e.g., Gillins v. Berkeley Elec. Coop., 148 F.3d 413, 416-17 (4th Cir. 1998)
(stating that although plaintiff demonstrated that defendant's reasons were "obviously
contrived," such evidence "is not in itself sufficient" to survive summary judgment because a
"pretext-plus" standard for summaryjudgment applies); Fisher v. Vassar Coll., 114 F.3d 1332,
1347 (2d Cir. 1997) (en bane) (reversing a finding of discrimination despite a sustainable
finding of pretext because there was not sufficient evidence of discrimination); Woods v.
Friction Materials, Inc., 30 F.3d 255, 260 (1st Cir. 1994) (stating that plaintiff must have
adequate direct or circumstantial evidence of animus beyond evidence of pretext to survive
summary judgment); Marcantel v. La. Dep't of Transp. & Dev., 37 F.3d 197, 200 (5th Cir.
1994) (stating that Hicks instructs that "the 'pretext-only' doctrine is not enough; even if the
employee proves that the employer's nondiscriminatory reason is pretextual, the plaintiff must
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burden on plaintiffs in their effort to tease out what it meant for a stated reason
to be a pretext for discrimination. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc. to clarify this precise point.55
Because courts have found this basic evidentiary rule so difficult to apply, the
Commission agrees with the Third Circuit that "[i]t does not denigrate the
intelligence of our jurors to suggest that they need some instruction in the
permissibility of drawing [an] inference [of discrimination from the falsity of
the employer's proffered explanation]. 56 Given the differences of opinion
among judges over the years concerning how a jury may use its finding of
pretext, "it would be disingenuous to argue that it is nothing more than a matter
of common sense."07 Although Judge Brorby thinks this whole question of the
permissive negative inference is more difficult for judges than for jurors, who
are more likely to rely on common sense and realize that trials are just about
prove that an unlawful discriminatory intent motivated the employer's action"); see also Reeves
v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 140 (2000) (explaining that the Court
granted certiorari to resolve conflict among the circuits "as to whether a plaintiff's prima facie
case of discrimination... combined with sufficient evidence for a reasonable factfinder to reject
the employer's nondiscriminatory explanation for its decision, is adequate to sustain a finding of
liability for intentional discrimination") (citation omitted).
55. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 140-41 (2000). Even
though the Reeves decision gave clear guidance on this point, a number of courts continue to
reject plaintiffs' cases because they do not have sufficient evidence beyond the showing of
pretext. See, e.g., Zapata-Matos v. Reckitt & Colman, Inc., 277 F.3d 40, 47 (1st Cir. 2002)
(stating "the slight suggestion of pretext here, absent other evidence from which discrimination
can be inferred," did not meet plaintiffs burden in Title VII national origin discrimination case
and granting summary judgment for employer); Price v. Fed. Express Corp., 283 F.3d 715,725
(5th Cir. 2002) (affirming summary judgment because plaintifffailed to produce evidence that
the employer's nondiscriminatory explanation was false and failed to present evidence raising
an inference of racial discrimination). In Price, an African American plaintiff met all job
prerequisites and had far more company seniority than selected white candidate. Id. at 718. He
lacked some posted qualifications but had military and police investigative experience that
arguably made him a better choice for security manager. Id. at 719. The court found that the
plaintiff's evidence did not disprove employer's explanation that the selected candidate was
better qualified, but went on to state that even assuming plaintiff "presented evidence showing
that FedEx's explanation is pretextual, his evidence of pretext does not support an inference that
intentional discrimination was the real reason for the employment decision." Id. at 723; see also
Mathes v. Furniture Brands Int'l, Inc., 266 F.3d 884, 887 (8th Cir. 2001) (affirming summary
judgment for defendant in an ADEA case where the court concluded that plaintiff's proof was
insufficient to get to trial because it "created only a very weak inference" that defendant's reason
for firing her was untrue; although the evidence showed defendant discharged her for reasons
other than her poor performance, the reason supported by the evidence was that her boss had a
personal preference to work with his previous secretary).
56. Smith v. Borough of Wilkinsburg, 147 F.3d 272, 281 (3d Cir. 1998) (remanding the
case for a new trial because the court failed to instruct jury on "pretext").
57. Id.
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whose story to believe, s8 in fact that assumption may unfairly denigrate the
"legal professionals" who have found this to be a thorny question. The
question has been a thorny one for precisely the reason identified at the outset:
Deciding someone has violated the laws against discrimination is a weighty
responsibility and it is a tough call to make when there is no affirmative
evidence of discriminatory animus.
Of course, the inference is only permissible, and jurors may certainly
refuse to draw that conclusion. Indeed, "the plaintiff may or may not ultimately
prevail in the litigation [by discrediting the employer's explanation], because
the factfinder may or may not choose to make the permissible inference of
discrimination." 9 Absent an instruction on pretext, however, there is no way to
know whether the jury exercised its prerogative not to make the inference, or
did not realize such an inference is permissible. That is precisely why in recent
decisions the courts of appeals have found reversible error in the refusal to give
a pretext, or negative inference instruction.6° In Townsend v. Lumbermens
Mutual Casualty Co., 61 the Tenth Circuit recognized that the significance of
pretext in determining discrimination has been a difficult matter for the courts
and "would certainly be difficult for a jury. ,62 Reasoning that "the danger [is]
too great that a jury might make the same assumption that the Fifth Circuit did
in Reeves," the court held:
[I]n cases such as this, a trial court must instruct jurors that if they
disbelieve an employer's proffered explanation they may-but need not-
infer that the employer's true motive was discriminatory. Moreover we are
persuaded by the position of the EEOC that the issue is whether in the
absence of any instructions about pretext, "the jury found for the defendant
because it believed the plaintiff could not prevail without affirmative
evidence that his race was a motivating factor in the challenged
employment decisions.
63
58. See Townsend v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 294 F.3d 1232,1247 (10th Cir. 2002)
(Brorby, J., dissenting) ("While the question of how much weight should be given to evidence
of pretext in discrimination cases has proven thorny for legal professionals, I doubt the jury
viewed this case as anything more than a trial to decide which party was telling the truth.").
59. Combs v. Plantation Patterns, 106 F.3d 1519, 1530 (1 Ith Cir. 1997); cf Dennis v.
Columbia Colleton Med. Ctr., Inc., 290 F.3d 639, 650-51 (4th Cir. 2002) (upholding trial
court's decision to give pretext instruction because the "instructions... made clear that the jury
could, but did not have to, infer discrimination if it disbelieved [the employer's] explanation").
60. See, e.g., Townsend, 294 F.3d at 1241 (finding error due to inadequate jury
instruction); Ratliff v. City of Gainesville, 256 F.3d 355, 364 (5th Cir. 2001) (finding error in
the district court's refusal to give an inference instruction).
61. Townsend, 294 F.3d at 1247 (10th Cir. 2002).
62. Id. at 1241.
63. Id. (quoting EEOC's brief as amicus curiae).
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The trial court in Townsend instructed the jury that for the plaintiff to
recover on his federal employment discrimination claim, he had to "prove by
the preponderance of the evidence that defendant intentionally discriminated
against plaintiff." The concurring judge in Townsend explained that giving this
"burden of proof' instruction, without an accompanying explanation of the
permissive inference that arises from a finding of pretext, is likely to confuse
the jury since a "rational juror might very well have interpreted such an
instruction to require affirmative proof of discriminatory intent. '" Because of
this potential jury confusion, "absent the proposed [pretext] instruction, jurors
are left without adequate guidance as to the circumstances in which they may
infer discriminatory intent.
65
In Ratliff v. City of Gainesville," the Fifth Circuit similarly remanded
plaintiff's ADEA claim for a new trial, holding that, "in light of the changes
made to a plaintiff's evidentiary burden in discrimination cases outlined in
Reeves, the district court erred in failing to give an inference instruction."
6 7
Consistent with the Fifth Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions, the district court in
Ratlif had advised the jurors that they were "permitted to draw such reasonable
inferences from the testimony and exhibits as... are justified in the light of
common experience,"6'8 but did not instruct the jury that it could infer that the
employer's explanation was a pretext for discrimination if it disbelieved the
employer's proffered reasons. 69 The Fifth Circuit rejected Gainesville's
arguments that the plaintiff s requested "pretext" instruction was redundant in
light of the general inference instruction and held that the requested instruction
was warranted.70
Those who believe the inference instruction is unnecessary suggest that it
will confuse jurors by focusing their attention on the intermediate question of
pretext rather than the ultimate question of discrimination, and by introducing
legal jargon such as "prima facie case" and "burden of production." The first
concern is misplaced because the point is that the pretext inquiry does merge
with the ultimate finding of discrimination and that the two questions are
64. Id. at 1243 (Henry, J., concurring).
65. Id. at 1244 (Henry, J., concurring).
66. Ratcliffv. City of Gainesville, 256 F.3d 355 (5th Cir. 2001).
67. Id. at 364.
68. Id. at 360 nn. 5-6.
69. See id. (listing jury instructions).
70. Id. at 361 n.7; see also Smith v. Borough of Wilkinsburg, 147 F.3d 272,281 (3d Cir.
1998) (remanding for a new trial because the district court failed to give "pretext" instruction);
Cabrera v. Jakabovitz, 24 F.3d 372,382 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that the court must inform the
jury of the permissive inference).
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intertwined. Rather than being an "intermediate" question, in indirect evidence
cases the pretext issue is really interconnected with the ultimate question. It is,
in essence, the whole ball game. 7' Further, the concern that such an instruction
necessarily involves the introduction of legal jargon is not a fair criticism
because it is a simple matter to frame the desired inference instruction without
using any legalistic terminology.
72
A related concern is that singling out this permissible inference gives it
undue emphasis because it is just one of an infinite number of permissible
inferences that jurors may make.73 There are two responses to this concern.
First, the other permissible inferences typically involve affirmative conclusions
that may be drawn from facts in evidence.74 For example, if the plaintiff
introduces evidence of stray remarks (that is, racial slurs directed at people
other than the plaintiff or made by people other than the decision maker),
statistical evidence (showing disproportionate underrepresentation of a
particular group), or the different treatment of similarly situated persons (as in
the Jones hypothetical facts that white persons who did not submit performance
improvement plans were not fired), the jury is readily able to understand that
such facts may suggest that the bias they reveal affected the employer's
treatment of the plaintiff. The jury may infer from affirmative evidence that
these facts may suggest that bias infected the decision the plaintiff is
challenging. But, in the negative inference context, the jury is allowed to
conclude that the employer has a discriminatory motive simply because it does
not believe the employer's explanations for what it did. Even more important
than the qualitative difference in the negative inference involved in the pretext
instruction, which lifts it out of the realm of the other typical permissive factual
inferences, is the fact that the negative inference deserves emphasis because it
is so integral to the plaintiff's theory of his case. For this reason, it is simply
too significant to omit.
75
71. See, e.g., Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Aff. v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,256 (1981) (finding that
pretext burden "merges with the ultimate burden").
72. See supra note 24 and accompanying text (giving sample instruction language).
73. See Townsend v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 294 F.3d 1232, 1245-46 (10th Cir.
2002) (Brorby, J., dissenting) ("In some instances, a facially neutral permissive inference might
draw unwarranted attention to a small portion of evidence presented at trial or mislead the jury
as to the applicable law.").
74. See, e.g., William J. Vollmer, Pretext in Employment Discrimination Litigation:
Mandatory Instructions for Permissible Inferences?, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 407, 441
(explaining possible inferences).
75. See Townsend, 294 F.3d at 1244 (Henry, J., concurring) ("[A]bsent the proposed
instruction, jurors are left without guidance .... ").
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There is also an argument that the instruction is unnecessary because the
point is better made by counsel in closing argument. Counsel's arguments,
however, are not an adequate substitute for a complete and accurate statement
of the law by the judge.76 It is the trial court that "must ensure 'that the jury [is]
given full and complete instructions by relating the law to the relevant evidence
in the case.' 7 As the Tenth Circuit noted in Townsend, "While counsel may
be relied on to point out facts and suggest reasoning, the judge's duty to give an
instruction on an applicable matter of law is clear. This is particularly true
where, as here, the law goes to the heart of the matter. 7 8 Indeed, as the Third
Circuit noted in Smith v. Borough of Wilkinsburg,79 "It is difficult to understand
what end is served by reversing [or, as in this case, denying] the grant of
summary judgment for the employer on the ground that the jury is entitled to
infer discrimination from pretext... if the jurors are never informed that they
may do so. "80
Although plaintiff's counsel may certainly argue to jurors that they can
infer discrimination if they do not find the employer's explanation credible, the
real thrust of the argument will usually be an effort to persuade the jury on that
basic factual issue, that is, to persuade the jury that the employer's reason is not
credible. In the Jones hypothetical, counsel would argue that the jury should
believe Mr. Jones's version of events that he was never counseled about his
performance or told to prepare a performance improvement plan. Counsel
would also argue that the lie to Jones that the employer's unit manager position
was being eliminated, and the employer's subsequent choice of a less qualified
white person to fill that very position, demonstrate that its stated reasons are
untrue. Counsel would argue that the very fact the company gave different
reasons at different times for its decision supports the conclusion that the
company is lying. Finally, of course, counsel would argue that all these
incredible statements have been offered to cover up a discriminatory motive.
76. But see Gehring v. Case Corp., 43 F.3d 340, 343 (7th Cir. 1994) (stating that "ajudge
need not deliver instructions describing all valid legal principles"); see also Moore v. Robertson
Fire Prot. Dist., 249 F.3d 786, 790 n.9 (8th Cir. 2001) (expressing doubt, in dicta, that the
pretext instruction is compulsory); Fite v. Digital Equip. Corp., 232 F.3d 3, 7 (1st Cir. 2000)
(same).
77. Smith v. Borough of Wilkinsburg, 147 F.3d 272, 279 (3d Cir. 1998) (quoting Choy v.
Bouchelle, 436 F.2d 319, 325 (3d Cir. 1970)).
78. Townsend, 294 F.3d at 1241; see also Smith, 147 F.3d at 278 (noting the "inescapable
duty of the trial judge to instruct the jurors, fully and correctly, on the applicable law of the
case" (internal quotes and citations omitted)).
79. Smith v. Borough of Wilkinsburg, 147 F.3d 272 (3d Cir. 1998).
80. Id. at 280.
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That last argument may well confuse the jury because it has heard that the
judge will explain the applicable law, and this point about permissible
inferences sounds like a legal principle. In other words, from a juror's
perspective, although it would seem to be appropriate for counsel to emphasize
the evidence that permits the jury to infer that the employer's reason is not true,
it is a qualitatively different argument to tell the jury it can conclude, despite
the absence of affirmative evidence, that its disbelief in the employer's reason
permits it to assume the employer is lying to cover up a discriminatory motive.
Meanwhile, defense counsel in this situation would argue just as
vigorously that its reasons are true, that it had a legitimate concern with Mr.
Jones' job performance and that it tried in good faith to let him know about his
deficiencies. Counsel would no doubt emphasize that the plaintiff did not
produce a shred of evidence that the employer acted with discriminatory
animus-that he could not produce any witness who ever heard a racial slur or
any suggestion by anyone that Mr. Jones's race had anything to do with his
difficulty in motivating his subordinates or his poor performance. Without a
statement of the law from the judge, the jury would have no neutral statement
of the legal rules that could legitimately guide its evaluation of the evidence.
Providing a statement of the governing rules is the judge's job, and it simply
cannot be done by counsel through argument, because then it sounds like an
argument instead of a rule.
In sum, the pretext instruction embodies a simple and common sense
principle that can be explained in nontechnical language. It embodies a correct
and crucial statement of the law that goes to the heart of the majority of
circumstantial evidence cases that go to ajury. Without the instruction there is
a very real possibility that jurors will not realize they are legally permitted to
find discrimination in the absence of affirmative evidence and that reviewing
courts will not be able to tell whether the absence of this instruction misled the
jury. Because the Supreme Court has twice instructed the lower courts that the
permissible inference is a legally correct and critically important principle in
employment discrimination cases, the lower courts should follow the logic of
Hicks and Reeves and act to create uniformity among the circuits without the
necessity for further Supreme Court review of this legal point. Because there is
no conceivable downside to giving the instruction, and because there is no legal
impediment and no risk of reversal on that basis, the courts should follow the
wise guidance of the Second, Third, Fifth and Tenth Circuits, and routinely
give a pretext instruction when the plaintiff has offered credible evidence of
pretext in a circumstantial evidence case.

